Abstract: This article demonstrates how scholarship and political positions can be negotiated when democratic and authoritarian systems converge in an international context; it takes as a case study cooperation among members of the International Association for Folklore and Ethnology (IAFE) and its successor organization, the International Association of European Ethnology and Folklore (IAEEF) 
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Europe. In particular, it examines how leading Swedish folklorists and ethnologists experienced the influence of Nazi politics as they sought international cooperation in their field. Attempts to dialogue with colleagues whose home countries had adopted fascism were combined with attempts to prevent Nazi dominance of the IAFE and IAEEF. This paper examines the discourses that circulated among different scholars and groups and demonstrates how these discourses constructed people, stances, and fields, sometimes in contradictory or self-serving ways. Discourse-historical analysis thus reveals how scholars from different countries negotiate the connections between scholarship and politics in varying political contexts.
In his memoirs, American Stith Thompson (1885 Thompson ( -1976 , a professor of English and Folklore at Indiana University, describes a special meeting in Uppsala, Sweden, that occurred on a dark afternoon in November 1935:
The next day I went across Sweden by train and arrived at Uppsala about four-thirty in the afternoon. It was already pitch dark. I was met by one of [Herman] Geijer's assistants and taken to a hotel with the were made toward developing the International Association of Folklore and Ethnology/Internationaler Verband für Volksforschung (IAFE), which was eventually founded in 1935 in Lund, Sweden, and in 1936 in Berlin, Germany. This article examines how leading Swedish folklorists and ethnologists in the 1930s experienced the influence of Nazi politics on their efforts to encourage international scholarly cooperation. Additionally, I suggest how these scholars' close connections to British and American colleagues influenced their opinions and their actions. The article explores in detail the work of the IAFE and its successor organization, the International Association for European Ethnology and Folklore (IAEEF). I argue that a number of Swedish folklorists and ethnologists played an important role in negotiating the position of their discipline amid the contest between democracy and dictatorship in the 1930s. As these negotiations developed, Swedish scholars Carl Wilhelm von Sydow (1887 Sydow ( -1952 and Åke Campbell (1891 Åke Campbell ( -1957 played a more significant role than earlier research on the IAFE has shown (e.g., Rogan 2008a and 2008b) . 2 After a short account of the IAFE's beginnings, I discuss the Swedish, British, American, and German influence on the organization during the latter part of the 1930s, the fear of Nazi dominance in the IAFE, and the counteractions taken by the IAFE board. Next, I explore the Nazi struggle for power in the fields of ethnology and folklore, as well as the organizational consequences of that struggle. The last part of the article addresses attempts to achieve successful cooperation among these parties. The events and discussions recounted here offer insight into how scholarship and political positions are negotiated when democratic and authoritarian systems converge in an international context.
A Discourse-Historical Approach to the Study of Knowledge Production
Scholarly knowledge production is always influenced by the political, economic, and cultural environments in which it occurs. At the same time, scholarship has a significant influence on political developments. Academic institutions and the scholars that populate them have a strong impact on the forms of knowledge they study, and they also shape what kinds of knowledge come to be seen as 'true,' 'good,' 'legitimate,' and 'acceptable' in a society. While academic knowledge or deconstruct them? In short, discourse-historical analysis attends to how meaning is created through language in different contexts.
This method can reveal the complexity of discursive practice. For example, the same person can defend a Jewish colleague in one context and contribute to anti-Semitic discourses in another (Garberding 2007) . Another important point is that this kind of discourse analysis does not state how persons or things are, but rather how subjects and objects are created. Wodak uses the term argumentation strategy, noting (like French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu) that a strategy need not be conscious, even when the author has set intentions for his or her text (Bourdieu 1993, 113; Wodak et al. 1998, 74-75) . Analyzing argumentation strategies can demonstrate more precisely how discourses are constructed through language by showing how speakers or writers attach importance to subjects, objects, or events in specific contexts.
In the discourses I examine here, scholars choose to include or exclude different actors; assert a positive presentation of self alongside a negative presentation of the other; or describe some people as active, while keeping others passive and in the background. These argumentation strategies, and the texts in which they are employed, show how various actors in the 1930s established discursive orders, constructed hierarchies, and positioned people, groups, and institutions.
The Beginning of the IAFE At the end of the 1920s there was already significant interest in organized international cooperation among scholars of folklore and ethnology: La Commission Internationale des Arts et Traditions Populaires (CIAP) had been founded at the Volkskunstkongress (Folk art congress) in Prague in 1928. By the beginning of the 1930s, however, several scholars were disappointed in the direction this organization had taken. They believed that the CIAP focused too much on popular culture, on culture as a kind of working possibility for unemployed people or as a form of entertainment during leisure time. At the Prague congress, Swedish folklorist Carl Wilhelm von Sydow's lecture about folk poetry was rejected, leading him to realize that folklore was not included among CIAP's research fields (Rogan 2007) . This is perhaps one reason Von Sydow began holding meetings in Uppsala and Lund in 1935 to explore the founding of an international folklore and ethnology organization.
At least two other important factors led to the founding of the IAFE. By the 1920s, Swedish scholars had already developed close relations with Irish and Scottish folklorists and ethnologists who, among other interests, were studying how Scandinavian cultural influence impacted Celtic, Irish, and Scottish culture, and vice versa (Bringéus 2008, 85; Ó Catháin 2008) . In 1920 Von Sydow visited Ireland for the first time, with the support of his Norwegian colleague Reidar Th. Christiansen (1886 see Bringéus 2006, 166); in 1924 , Von Sydow and Irish folklorist Séamus Ó Duilearga (1899 -1980 established strong professional ties. 4 The Scottish Anthropological Society, founded in 1934, also became an important partner for Swedish folklorists and ethnologists. 5 (Thompson 1932-37 and 1955-58) and his revisions of Antti Aarne's type index (Thompson 1928 and 1961). 6 After World War II, Thompson invited several European colleagues to a conference in Bloomington, Indiana, and he also helped many of them establish networks among American scholars. These European connections to the United States and Britain proved important to the development of Swedish-German relations in folklore and ethnology during the Nazi period. Of course, the main reason for establishing an international organization was scholarly need. Von Sydow, along with his European and American colleagues, wanted to study folklore across national borders and was thus interested in ways to facilitate comparison of different ethnic groups, regions, and countries. The goal of several folklorists and ethnologists was the establishment of an international archive for fairy tales and other collected texts. Through the 1930s, many scholars found it difficult to access material from other countries and in different languages. One task of the archives, then, would be to organize translations into the major European languages. Von Sydow hoped to locate this archive in Greifswald or in Copenhagen; he perceived both locations as good environments for this work, partly because they could be reached easily by foreign scholars. In Greifswald, Von Sydow's good friend and colleague Lutz Mackensen (1901-92) , who worked as a professor in German philology and folklore at the Universities of Greifswald, Riga, and Ghent, was well connected to other scholars in Europe. And Copenhagen was already the site of the Dansk Folkemindesamling (Danish folklore collection). American folklorists were also interested in this project; they hoped to apply for US funding to help establish the archives and, in return, to receive copies of all materials that were relevant to their own research.
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Another of Von Sydow's plans was to found an international journal of folklore and ethnology. In fact, in 1907 Von Sydow, Kaarle Krohn (1863 -1933 ), and Axel Olrik (1864 -1917 published the first issue of Folklore Fellows Communications, a journal still in print today (Göttsch 1992, 83) . In subsequent years, however, the theoretical approaches of Von Sydow and Krohn diverged. This is likely another reason Von Sydow wanted to establish international cooperation: he hoped to find others more congenial to his own scholarly position. In fact, many of the first members of the IAFE were invited by Von Sydow himself, following discussions with his Swedish colleagues Herman Geijer (1871 -1943 , Åke Campbell, and Sigurd Erixon (1888-1968) . 8 Prior to the meetings in Uppsala and Lund, Swedish folklorists and ethnologists held separate private planning sessions with their German and British counterparts (e.g., Mackensen 1932; Mackensen, Gair, and Campbell 1937) .
After preparatory meetings in Lund in 1935, the IAFE was formally founded during April 1936 conferences held in the Berlin offices of the Atlas der deutschen Volkskunde (ADV [Atlas of German folk culture]). At this meeting, Geijer was voted in as the IAFE president; Norwegian folklorist Knut Liestøl (1881 Liestøl ( -1952 , German ethnologist Adolf Spamer (1883 Spamer ( -1953 , and Dutch philologist Jan de Vries (1890 Vries ( -1964 those countries that had entered the organization at the earlier meetings in Sweden were also chosen. Sweden was represented by Geijer, Campbell, Erixon, and Von Sydow (Mackensen, Gair, and Campbell 1937) .
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Arthur Haberlandt (1889 Haberlandt ( -1964 , professor of ethnology and director of the Austrian Museum of Ethnology in Vienna, served as the Austrian representative. He was likely chosen because of his international experience gained working within the CIAP (Bockhorn 1994, 508-9) ; further, he and Swedish colleague Sigurd Erixon were both museum directors who studied farmer culture. The choice of Haberlandt was probably one reason another ethnologist in Austria, Richard Wolfram (1901-95) , was not involved in the work of the IAFE or its successor organization, the IAEEF. 11 After the Berlin meeting, fifteen European countries and the United States became members of the IAFE. The leaders of the organization decided to send out twenty questions, inspired by questions from the German ADV project, to the different member states and to publish an international journal, Folk, which would be financed by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG [German Research Foundation] ; see Mackensen, Gair, and Campbell 1937, 21) . The journal's board included Campbell, G. R. Gair (Edinburgh) , and Mackensen (Berlin/Riga). Scholars from the Scandinavian countries, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States played the most active roles in the IAFE during the years immediately following its establishment. These same scholars also played a formative role in deciding what direction the IAFE would take.
IAFE: An Organ of Nazi Propaganda?
While Swedish folklorists and ethnologists seemed to have looked upon their cooperation with Nazi Germany as unproblematic because it was mainly related to academic work, by the summer of 1936 British scholars were troubled by the IAFE's connection to the Third Reich. In July of that year, Åke Campbell received a letter from Scottish colleague G. R. Gair, who wrote that he had heard "accusations" against IAFE alleging that the organization was an instrument for Nazi propaganda:
Regarding this Nazi business, I have had long correspondence with the Royal Anthropological Institute and others and it appears that they are convinced that the association is existing for German propaganda. They are now accusing us of being pro-Nazis, and no amount of reasonable arguments seems to be of any avail. [. . .] Now, I may tell you and Professor Geijer in the very strictest confidence that I have traced the origin of this attack. As far as I can see there are a number of Jewish Professors in the University of London, who have considerable influence upon English Anthropology who are determined to break any Organization that is showing itself at all friendly towards Germany. So bitter is their attack that they are now accusing me and this Institute of receiving subsidies to the extent of several thousands a year from the German government!!! This you all know is a gross exaggeration, but I cite it so that you may see how bitter is the feeling against the Germans in some quarters in this Country-mainly among people of alien extraction. (Gair 1936a) Here, Gair paints himself and the members of the IAFE as victims even as he constructs a group of internal enemies: those scholars who wanted to cease all cooperation with Nazi Germany. These critics perceived the IAFE as a political organization, not a dispassionate scientific endeavor, and they understood all connections with Germany as political activities that supported the rise of the Nazi regime. Gair downplays this perception when he writes, "This you all know is a gross exaggeration." In fact, he traces the accusations back to "a number of Jewish Professors in the University of London" who wanted to prevent all cooperation with Nazi Germany. This description is a negative presentation of the Other within an anti-Semitic discourse; that is, because the accusations came only from "a number of Jewish" colleagues-and perhaps not from Scottish authorities-Gair believed they did not need to be taken seriously.
In a letter written two weeks later, Gair told Campbell that he had discovered the main source of the accusations-Charles G. Seligman (1873 Seligman ( -1940 , a professor at London University:
Seligman was once Professor of Ethnology (Barberology not Volkskunde!) in London University and is a German Jew who is trying to stop all scientific cooperation with the Germans. I beg of you, Prof. Geijer & Prof. Erixon to waste no time on him [. . .] . (Gair 1936b; underlining in original) Here again, Gair constructs an anti-Semitic discourse. Seligman's opinion is not worth a second thought because he is both a "German Jew" and, according to Gair, not a real ethnologist. Moreover, Gair differentiates between Volkskunde-a discipline that studies 'civilized' culture-and "Barberology," no doubt referring to Seligman's anthropological research on tribes in Africa and New Guinea. At the time, many of Gair's contemporaries categorized these groups as primitive and uncivilized; linking Seligman to them is another discursive move to position Seligman as a scholar who should not be taken seriously.
Nonetheless, the accusations worried Gair. His July 1 letter to Campbell noted, "We must be most careful in the reports that we are giving out, lest we give any pretext for criticism." He recommended that Campbell choose his words carefully when visiting Germany. In his correspondence, Gair positions himself and Campbell as "nonpolitical," emphasizing that he regarded Germany as "a friendly State" and that he was "prepared to co-operate with German institutions" (Gair 1936a ). According to Gair, the cooperation with Nazi Germany was purely scientific work. Gair's statements also reflected then-current discussions in Great Britain about the Nazi regime's attempts to use folklore in its political propaganda. Gair likely had in mind a May 1936 newspaper article in which he was interviewed about the Berlin meetings and the international atlas work. The interview, which was published under the ironic title "Are you an Aryan? Ethnology Congress in Edinburgh," also mentions the DFG's complete financing of the IAFE (Edinburgh Evening News 1936) . Another example is a report published some months later by Welsh solicitor Frederick Llewellyn Jones. In an article for The Scotsman, Jones tells about his latest trip to Europe, explaining that German universities sent their students to areas with German minorities outside Germany's borders. Officially, the students were there to study "German folk-lore"; however, "the main object [was] to introduce the Nazi virus into these populations" (1937) . Llewellyn warned that German politics presented a great danger to peace in Europe.
How did Gair's Swedish colleagues react to his warning? Åke Campbell and Herman Geijer disregarded Gair's evaluation of Seligman and invited the Jewish professor and his colleague, Harold Coote Lake (1878 Lake ( -1939 of the Royal Anthropological Society and Folklore Society, to Uppsala in August 1936 for a "private and confidential interview." Sigurd Erixon also held a meeting with English anthropologist Ethel John Lindgren (1905-88) in Stockholm in September of that year (Coote Lake 1936; Lindgren 1936) . At the Uppsala meeting, Campbell, Geijer, Seligman, and Coote Lake discussed not only the implications of Nazi involvement, but also the direction of further international work in the IAFE. The British scholars disliked that the organization's journal, Folk, was financed solely by the DFG, and they feared Nazi domination of the international body. Seligman cited examples from an article in Nature about racial persecution in Nazi Germany. Geijer responded that he had heard about the article, but believed that the examples cited therein were merely exceptions. Seligman emphasized that Folk's financial dependence on the DFG gave the Germans "a very strong voice in determining policy" (Coote Lake 1936, 1) . Geijer explained the urgent need to start the journal and observed that DFG funding was meant to last only for the journal's first year. The hope was that Folk would later become financially independent, or that it would be financed by all the member states. Geijer added that the DFG had earmarked a large sum of money for support of folklore research and that for the Germans, a few thousand Reichsmark was not very much money.
Despite the minimization of the Nazi threat by Scottish colleague Gair, Coote Lake and Seligman were also worried about the effects that DFG backing might have on the editorial board of Folk:
The control of the journal would be in the hands of an Editorial Board consisting of Dr. Mackensin 12 of Riga (a German); Dr Aake Campbell of Uppsala; Dr. Jan de Fries of Leyden; and Dr. Gair of Edinburgh. It was intended as time went on to vary this Board and to put on Editors of different nationalities. The genesis of the idea of the Congress arose at the International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences in London in 1934, where there was no section devoted to European folklore. The intention was originally to confine the new association to Northern countries, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, etc. and Scotland. While the matter still was being discussed, the Germans independently approached Prof. Geiger with a similar scheme, which of course included Germany, and the project was then enlarged. That the German offer should come at this time was pure coincidence. Professor Geiger himself had some fear of German Governmental domination, and that was one reason why he strongly hoped that an English representation would be present in order to counteract any such danger. He was sure that many Germans were quite independent of political influence and could be trusted to work scientifically. (Coote Lake 1936, 1) Here it is obvious that the IAFE scholars wanted to get British colleagues into the IAFE in order to prevent Nazi dominance within the organization. Both Seligman and Coote Lake are reluctant about working with German scholars: Coote Lake's report imagines a serious threat (i.e., Nazi politics could dominate the work of the IAFE, turning it into a political organization), while Seligman warns against "a very strong voice in determining policy" and mentions "Nazi domination" (Coote Lake 1936, 1) .
Two groups are constructed in this discourse: Swedish and British 'anti-Nazi' scholars are placed at odds with Nazi politicians and Naziinfluenced scholars. However, these records also show that the British scholars were more careful than their Swedish colleagues in assessing the consequences of cooperating with Nazi Germany. Coote Lake believed the German invitation to cooperate was "pure coincidence." But material from Swedish and German archives demonstrates that cooperation in broader disciplinary efforts had existed between Swedish and German scholars since the 1920s. 13 Moreover, the Swedes were not as worried as their British colleagues. According to Geijer, it was important to distinguish between two kinds of German scholars: those who still "were quite independent of political influence and could be trusted to work scientifically" and those who were working for the Nazi regime (Coote Lake 1936, 1).
14 During the 1930s, bifurcating ethnological research probably made it possible to cooperate with German colleagues (who were assumed to belong to the first, 'true' group) and still keep a safe psychological distance from Nazi politics. This may be a common way that scholars in democratic societies negotiate relationships with colleagues who are living in dictatorships: they simply have to choose the 'right' people, namely, those who are not actively taking part in an 'evil' system and who seem to be scientifically objective and independent.
Geijer's argument, which assumes that German scholars were free to decide whether they wanted to work for the government, is typical of such an approach. Because German scholars could choose their political alignments, he reasoned, their colleagues in other countries could simply decide which individuals to embrace and which to avoid. Geijer's optimistic estimation of the academic situation in Nazi Germany at that time likely resulted from a long tradition of close scientific collaboration between Germans and Swedes. All of the Swedish scholars I have mentioned here-Geijer, Campbell, Erixon, and Von Sydow-belonged to a generation of Swedish academics who grew up with great respect for German scholarship.
It is also possible that German academics consciously avoided political discussions with their Swedish colleagues, since Swedish skepticism toward Nazi race politics was well known. Recent research provides numerous examples in which the Nazi government in Berlin instructed German scholars, artists, and others who were visiting Sweden to avoid discussing politics and anti-Semitism with Swedish people. The Nazi idea was that "neutral" Sweden should be handled very carefully-partly by paying attention to Swedish research, music, art, and literature-in order to establish a positive image of Nazi Germany. Nazi propaganda was to be "camouflaged" and presented as "non-political" in Sweden (Almgren 2005, 283 ; see also Åkerlund 2010; Garberding 2007; Roth 2009 ).
The material from the Swedish and British archives thus demonstrates uncertainty on the part of Swedish scholars about the Nazi academic environment: in the mid-1930s they had greater confidence in German scholarship than their British colleagues did. But just in case German colleagues had been compromised, the Swedes thought it was best to ward off Nazi domination of the IAFE by encouraging the presence of scholars overtly skeptical of German involvement: thus Geijer's reported hope that "an English representation would be present in order to counteract any such danger." Coote Lake and Seligman likely wanted to exclude Germany from the IAFE (even if they did not explicitly make that claim in the 1936 report), while their Swedish colleagues considered cooperation with German scholars too valuable to give up entirely.
Another possible interpretation of Coote Lake's 1936 report could be that the British scholars looked up to their Swedish colleagues, who had been instrumental in establishing the discipline of anthropology in Ireland, England, Wales, and Scotland. This might be another reason for British acceptance of German representation in the IAFE: they depended on their Swedish colleagues for the development of their disciplines and did not want to jeopardize good relations. Because the discipline was still young in Great Britain and had just begun to establish itself in archives and at universities, the British scholars needed the Swedish expertise in the field. Coote Lake's summary of the August 1936 meeting with Seligman confirms this interpretation: "Relations throughout [the interview] were friendly and cordial. The interview may or not may achieve anything but it may be hoped that it has pointed out to Prof. Geiger [sic] and Dr. Campbell that there are dangers to be faced" (Coote Lake 1936, 3) .
The next month, in September 1936, Sigurd Erixon met Ethel John Lindgren in Stockholm, where the two discussed the need to improve communication among Swedish, Scottish, and English scholars. All were anxious to cooperate with one another. Erixon mentioned to Lindgren that Germany was planning an atlas of Nordic culture. He argued that Scandinavian scholars already had good methods and had collected a large amount of material, so they were in "a better position [than the Germans] to make such an atlas themselves, and preferred to do so" (Lindgren 1936, 1-2) . According to Lindgren's report, Erixon added: "For this task of making an independent atlas, English, Scottish and Irish material was urgently needed, and this supplied much of the impetus behind the contacts made with Professor Rose and others in London in 1934" (2) . He told Lindgren, too, that he also feared a "preponderance of influence" from Germany through the financing of Folk.
During their discussion, the two decided to encourage the delegates of each IAFE member country to work toward financing the journal through their own governments. Lindgren reports that Erixon "stated categorically that the origin and interests of the society [IAFE] had nothing to do with movements towards 'racial exclusiveness.'" Erixon apparently argued that the Swedish way of "folk-loristic research" had been proceeding intensively in Sweden for over twenty-five years and at the present time, due to generous State support, sixty workers were sent out by him every summer, from Stockholm University, to collect material, while one hundred were sent out from Uppsala. There was an immense collection of material in their 'archives' as a result and their one objective was to co-ordinate the work of this kind, which was going on in the various northern European countries, including Germany. The 'Romance' countries have not yet been included because so much work has already been done there, and with a rather different, primarily linguistic, orientation. (Lindgren 1936, 2) Here, Erixon echoes the arguments of Campbell and Geijer. Cooperation with Great Britain was necessary for both political and academic reasons: first, to prevent a "preponderance of influence" from Germany, and second, to develop the coordination between Northern European countries. Erixon rejects suspicions of racism in Swedish folklore and ethnology by arguing for the long continuity of Swedish research in the field and by constructing a discourse of Northern European cultural community.
At the same time, however, he remains vague about where and how the material was collected, as well as whose culture was represented in it. It is important to note that Erixon, along with the other Swedish scholars I have mentioned above, was eager to define this discourse of Northern European culture. A possible interpretation here is that the Swedish researchers wanted to protect it from being co-opted by Nazi ideas. Many of the researchers born in Scandinavia had an essentialized view of being Nordic: they saw themselves as part of 'the Nordic race,' a common discourse in the 1930s. Von Sydow, for example, wrote that being Nordic also implied democracy and freedom of speech (Garberding 2010). Here, a common race-based discourse that included ideals of freedom and democracy becomes a tool to resist Nazism. When Erixon asserts that researchers in Great Britain should help him and his colleagues make their own Nordic atlas, he both means to counteract German attempts to define Nordic race discourse from a Nazi point of view and assumes that ethnologists and folklorists born in Scandinavia are the best scholars to do the work, since they have the best knowledge about Northern European culture.
As the minutes from the September 1936 meeting make clear, however, Erixon did not want to exclude Nazi Germany from combined ventures-he even includes Germany within the community of "northern European countries." It is obvious that he felt cooperation with Nazi Germany posed some risks; however, he expected this cooperation to take place on a purely scientific basis. Meanwhile, material from German archives demonstrates clearly that the skeptical British scholars were right in their estimation: the Nazi regime had concrete plans to use the IAFE as part of its political agenda.
The Struggle for Power in Nazi Organizations and its Impact on the IAFE, 1936-37
The IAFE was formally founded in the offices of the ADV in Berlin during the first week of April 1936. One consequence of the society's founding in Berlin was that the Nazi regime had insight into the organization from the beginning and regarded it as a suitable instrument for propaganda. For example, members of the IAFE were invited to the Landesstelle Kurmark für deutsche Volksforschung (Kurmark regional institute for German folk research) on April 2, 1936 ; present were several Nazi politicians, among them a representative from the Ministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (ProMi [Ministry of public enlightenment and propaganda]). Political speeches also played a role in the event. An unsigned report about the meeting was written (probably for the ProMi) that emphasized the German impact on the IAFE. But the report also demonstrates poor knowledge about the new organization and its members: for example, Campbell is misidentified as Irish, Erixon as a representative for the National Museum in Stockholm, and Gair as "Prof. Year" (Report 1936) .
The report makes it obvious that the Nazi politicians did not care much at all about the scholars' research interests, but were instead concerned with their own political aims. For example, Mr. Buchhorn, the area's minister of culture (Gauamtsleiter für Kultur), mentioned in his speech the close connection between the "Nazi revolution" (Bewegung) and scholarship. He also emphasized the hierarchical structure of culture and scholarship in Nazi Germany, in which the NS Kulturgemeinde (National Socialist cultural community) was now the "only acceptable" organization; no other institutions were allowed to exist. Throughout the meeting minutes, the anonymous recorder presents Nazi politicians as the actors, while their international guests are a passive background audience (Report 1936) . Though the Nazi leaders used this meeting for political purposes, it was likely an ineffective instance of propaganda, since the whole meeting occurred as a one-way communication in which the international guests were not actively included. It is strange, too, to note that Buchhorn told these guests, who had just founded a new international organization, that no organization other than the NS Kulturgemeinde would be accepted in Germany. Unfortunately, as of this writing, I have discovered no materials that depict how the visiting scholars felt about this meeting.
Another example of the IAFE as a tool for Nazi propaganda is a letter written by IAFE vice president Adolf Spamer to the DFG some months after the April 1936 meeting in Berlin. In his letter, he describes the organization and the Berlin meetings, emphasizing that the IAFE could never exist without support from the DFG:
Because of the (in my opinion) very adroit conference leadership on the part of the hosts, we were able to establish two goals for the International Association for Folklore and Ethnology, goals that have long been important to German Volkskunde research: 1.) The planning of a common Germanic atlas of folk culture, 2.) The founding of an international journal, "Folk." (Spamer 1936) 15 In his letter, Spamer encourages the DFG to keep its promise to finance Folk so that it will be possible to launch the journal and to secure "German influence on this international organ." Doing so was very important for the DFG's prestige abroad. Spamer's 1936 letter, when coupled with the report after the IAFE visit to the ADV offices, makes it clear that Nazi Germany meant to dominate the production of knowledge and that international cooperation was useful insofar as it could help Germany gain political influence in other countries.
As I have mentioned, no texts have been found that demonstrate the views of the Scandinavian and British researchers regarding these exchanges in Germany. It is likely that they discussed the Berlin meetings in person, rather than via written letters. However, letters in the Åke Campbell manuscript collection at the Institutet för språk och folkminnen (Institute for language and folklore) in Uppsala show that the meetings at the ADV offices initiated a great deal of activity. Members circulated and discussed drafts of questionnaires for a common Germanic atlas; the agenda for the project mentioned the quality and size of possible maps. In addition, the first articles for the new journal arrived. The correspondence in this collection demonstrates that several Swedish scholars were involved in the atlas work, including Erixon, Sigfrid Svensson (1901-84 ; at that time director of the folk department of the Northern Museum in Stockholm), and Svensson's colleague Gösta Berg , among others (Geijer 1937) . The atlas work gave expression to a hegemonic discourse about a common Germanic background as the basis for research in the field of ethnology at that time. The idea that people who were born in Scandinavia, Germany, or Great Britain belonged to a 'Germanic people' was experienced as obvious and natural, as a topic that had to be explored. But the Swedish researchers in the IAFE mostly talked about cultural research-and not about race-in their correspondence and in the minutes from IAFE meetings. 16 In the mid-1930s, Nazi influence was strengthened and institutionalized in Germany. Recent research has described how a new generation of scholars and politicians-mainly young academics who were born at the beginning of the nineteenth century-came into power during this period. In 1930s Germany, conflicts between scholars and politicians of different generations developed such that they had important consequences for Swedish-German relations and for international cooperation in folklore and ethnology. At the beginning of the 1930s, many young academics in the Weimar Republic described their own situation as "desperate"; it was extremely difficult for them to land positions. At that time only one-third of all academics with a doctoral degree in the Humanities could expect a position at a university (Grüttner 2002, 342) . Moreover, these young, highly educated people belonged to a generation whose political development had been influenced by radical German-nationalistic völkisch ideas, and many of them sympathized with right-wing parties. These academics founded new organizations, the so-called Dozentenschaften, which became powerful instruments at several universities and led to conflict between established professors and young associate professors. Beginning in 1933, it was compulsory for everyone who did not have a lifelong position at a university (Beamtenstellung) to join a Dozentenschaft. Dozentenschaft members also organized compulsory meetings and training camps in which Dozenten performed mental and physical exercises to prove that they were National Socialists with good character and healthy bodies (cf. Dröge 1993, 50) . Camp leaders reported results to the rectors of the universities.
In this environment, few young scholars protested against the anti-Semitic "Law for the Re-Establishment of Civil Service" (Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums), which was enacted in 1933. About twenty percent of all university employees lost their positions because of their 'race' or their political opinion (Grüttner 2002, 346) . Many unemployed academics supported the law because it opened up academic careers for them.
I am describing the situation in Germany in greater detail than some might deem necessary because this generational struggle had significant consequences for the IAFE and for the development of international relations in the study of folklore and ethnology. In this field, for instance, disputes arose about who should have charge of the ADV. From its inception, the ADV project was managed by Alfred Rosenberg's Reichsgemeinschaft für deutsche Volksforschung (Association for German folk research). In 1937, Heinrich Harmjanz (1904-94) , a new scholar from the younger generation, emerged on the scene. Harmjanz had studied sociology, Volkskunde, and linguistics at the University of Königsberg. In 1937 he received a professorship at Königsberg, and in 1938 he earned an additional professorship at the University of Frankfurt. However, during 1938 and 1939 he was on leave from both positions because of his political work. In May 1937, the DFG made Harmjanz director of the ADV project-a position that generated a high level of prestige and control of a large amount of funding. In April that same year, Harmjanz became a Referent (assistant) in the Amt Wissenschaft (Department for scholarship) at the Reichsministerium für Wissenschaft, Erziehung, und Volksbildung (REM [Reich ministry for science, education, and folk training]). There he was responsible for the development of the humanities, and he established close connections to the REM's minister, Bernhard Rust. Harmjanz became a member of the Nazi Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei [NSDAP]) in 1930 and even joined the SS a short time later (Schmoll 2008; 2009, 165-68) . In his position as leader of the ADV project, he strengthened the connections between the atlas and the DFG, the REM, and Himmler's SS-Ahnenerbe (Ancestral inheritance foundation). In 1938, he transferred the ADV to the SS-Ahnenerbe. These actions meant that radical Nazi ideology had a much stronger impact on academic work than it had during the preceding years. By 1938, the scholars who were successful in Nazi Germany-those who could combine a political position with scientific work in the framework of a clear Nazi convictionbelieved that scholarship and politics belonged together in support of a Nazi political agenda.
In order to obtain these powerful positions, it was necessary for Harmjanz and his colleagues at the REM to cut off several of Rosenberg's collaborators and sympathizers. One consequence was the weakening of German representation within the IAFE. Lutz Mackensen and Karl Kaiser (1906-40) , for instance, got into trouble with the REM. 17 In a January 1937 letter to Rust-the REM ministerRosenberg had suggested Kaiser as a possible leader of the ADV project (Dröge 1993, 44) . Kaiser was well known as a good researcher and had much experience with atlas work, both from a period of work on the ADV in Berlin during the years 1931-32 and from his work as editor of the Atlas der Pommerschen Volkskunde (Atlas of Pomeranian folk culture) in Greifswald, published in 1936.
But Kaiser had also supervised the graduate work of Matthes Ziegler (1911-92) , one of Harmjanz's strongest enemies. Ziegler had connections to Swedish and Danish folklorists, too, mainly to Von Waldemar Liungman (1883-1978) in Sweden and to Hans Ellekilde (1891 Ellekilde ( -1966 in Denmark. 18 In 1933, Ziegler visited Copenhagen and Lund for three months in order to collect material for his thesis, "Die Frau im Märchen. Eine Untersuchung deutscher und nordischer Märchen" (The woman in Märchen: a study of German and Nordic fairytales; 1937). That same year, Liungman offered Ziegler a position as a German assistant at his institute at Stockholm University.
Instead, Ziegler chose to fast-track his career in Nazi Germany (Dow and Lixfeld 1994, 193-95 The journal 'Folk' is a private undertaking of Spamer and Mackensen with the assistance of DFG funds; unfortunately, the journal serves only the interests of other countries (with German money) and it is, unfortunately like everything else that comes from M., a hasty and barely half-finished business. By means of a telephone call to the publisher Hirzel in Leipzig, I have now ordered an immediate suspension of the publication of the second volume, because it says the most foolish, unauthoritative things about REM's higher education policy in Volkskunde and folk research. (Harmjanz 1937) 19 Folk became a means for pushing away Mackensen, Kaiser, and Spamer, among others. In the correspondence I cite above, Harmjanz devalues Folk as the private business of just two people-specifically, two people he wanted to fail. But this was not enough: Harmjanz also accuses the other member countries of using German money for their own national interests, without giving anything back. He describes Folk as ill-suited to the development of German scholarship, opining that the journal's content is unacceptable. Material from German archives shows that Harmjanz criticized articles by Karl Kaiser, Erich Röhr, and Jan de Vries in particular, mostly because he believed that they gave the "wrong picture" of German Volkskunde and the ADV. While he accused Röhr of bringing non-official information about the ADV to an international public, he criticized De Vries and Kaiser for painting a negative picture of Volkskunde research and the ADV for scholars in other countries (De Vries 1937, 107-8; Kaiser 1937, 147-67; Parteiamtliche Prüfungs-kommission 1937; Röhr 1937, 113-46) . Kaiser particularly got into serious trouble and lost financing for his work on the Pomeranian atlas. In 1939, he felt so desperate about his financial and academic position that he enlisted as a soldier. One year later, he was killed in the Voges (Garberding 2010; Schmoll 2009, 161-64) .
In 1937, the Nazi government established a censorship program. Every publication in Nazi Germany was checked for the political position of its author, and publications critical of Nazism were prohibited. However, because Folk was an international journal with an international board, it was difficult for the Nazi authorities to control. On the one hand, Folk had the potential for spreading Nazi propaganda and promoting a positive opinion about Nazi Germany abroad; on the other hand, Folk might be used to criticize Nazi German scholarship and politics. Thus the journal offers a striking example of the tensions that can arise when an international discursive forum is positioned between democracy and dictatorship, controlled by people with differing visions of the relationship between scholarly production and politics.
The problem of Folk's financing was eventually solved by Sigurd Erixon and the Gustav Adolf Academy in Sweden. At the end of 1937, Erixon folded Folk into another international journal for the Northern and the Baltic countries, this one titled Folk-Liv. An immediate disadvantage for folklorists was that studies of narrative and other forms were given less space in Folk-Liv than they had been granted in Folk, probably because Erixon's main interest was material culture. However, discussions among Campbell, de Vries, and Erixon led to increased prominence of verbal forms beginning in 1938 (De Vries 1938a and 1938b; Erixon 1938) . According to Norwegian ethnologist Bjarne Rogan, Erixon was the "victor on the European battlefield" at that time because he could spread his own view on ethnology through the new international journal, which was now an organ not only for the IAFE, but also for a new organization called the International Association for European Ethnology and Folklore (IAEEF), which replaced the IAFE in 1937 (Rogan 2008a, 63, 85 In spring 1937, the IAFE encountered additional problems. Members of the association had already spent some months preparing for the organization's first international congress, which would be held in Edinburgh. Among other goals, the Scottish and Swedish scholars hoped the event would help establish Scottish anthropology as an academic discipline (Campbell 1937a) . In May 1937, IAFE scholars held meetings in Brussels in order to prepare for the Edinburgh congress. There, the Swedish and British scholars presented a program draft that was strongly criticized by the German and Dutch representatives. Lutz Mackensen commented on the discussions in Brussels in the following letter, which was probably sent to the Nazi government:
The Brussels board meeting of the 'International Association for Folklore and Ethnology' found itself in difficulties because of the excessive officiousness of the former English secretary, Mr. Gair, which led to such a string of clumsiness and confusion in the preparations for the Edinburgh congress that it put the cooperation of the assembly to the extreme test. Indeed, Mr. Gair himself was removed from his position as their spokesman by the controlling folklore institutions (especially the Scottish Anthropological Society). On the other hand, the English and the never-far-away Scandinavians stood fast by [their plans for] Edinburgh. They presented a program that was developed (to the exclusion of all other board members) as part of an English-Scandinavian arrangement and concerned itself only with the British-Scandinavian questions of Britons and Scandinavians. Both the Dutch vice president de Vries and I voiced energetic objections to this course of action. Furthermore, to me it was self-evident that official or quasi-official German participation was out of the question, so long as England maintained its refusal to take part in the anniversary ceremony at [the University of] Göttingen. (Mackensen 1937) 20 Ultimately, the solution at the Brussels meetings was to announce the Edinburgh congress as a special "British-Scandinavian congress"; in the end, no Germans attended it. Mackensen's report blames Gair for all the trouble; indeed, the latter's removal from his post as spokesman for the Scottish Anthropological Society (SAS) and the correspondence between Swedish ethnologists and the SAS make it clear that Gair's own colleagues lacked confidence in him (e.g., Cooper 1937) . But Mackensen also describes the close cooperation between Scandinavia and Great Britain as a problem: Germany and the Netherlands felt excluded from the program proposed for Edinburgh. He suspected that Swedish-British cooperation was going on behind Germany's back. Probably the German scholars were not aware of the already well-established connections between Scandinavia and Great Britain at that time. As I have emphasized earlier, it was not obvious to all British scholars that Germany should be included in the IAFE's efforts; in fact, it was mainly Swedish scholars who wanted to include German researchers. These documents and conversations highlight different and sometimes competing ideas about international cooperation that existed in folklore and ethnology in 1930s Europe. British and Scandinavian scholars had realized their goal of keeping Germany in the background in order to counteract a possible Nazi threat. But at the same time, they needed the German financing of Folk and did not want to destroy their connections to German colleagues. The timing of these negotiations was in fact quite poor, because they occurred just as the new generation of Nazi-influenced scholars was beginning to take over in Berlin, and the report from Brussels made these new academics extremely skeptical both of the IAFE and of the DFG's financial backing for Folk. Though no German scholars actually participated in the Edinburgh congress, the Austrian historian Adolf Helbok (1883 Helbok ( -1969 criticized the conference in a report to the Nazi government (Helbok 1937 ). Helbok-a historian, philologist, and ethnologist-was also a racial researcher then employed by the University of Leipzig. He was a devout Nazi and talked openly about his political sympathies (e.g., Johler 1994, 458; Schmoll 2009, 105) . I discuss Helbok's role in greater detail below.
In 1937, the Scottish Anthropological Society had its own problems. In a letter to Andreas Lindblom (1889-1977), Seligman criticized Gair for promoting Gair's own wishes and beliefs rather than representing the IAFE's ideas. He also accused him of receiving money from the Nazi government and having plans to settle in Berlin (Seligman 1936) . In April 1937, Gair was dismissed as the Scottish Anthropological Society's spokesman in the IAFE and replaced by David Crichton and R. Kerr (Cooper 1937; Kerr 1937) . 21 It is possible that the Society's internal problems were among the reasons Scottish influence on the IAFE decreased in the following months.
But at the time of the Edinburgh congress in July 1937, another country was entering the scene of folklore and ethnology: France. It was probably both their exclusion from Edinburgh and the plans for the World Exposition in Paris that inspired French scholars and museum managers Georges Henri Rivière (1897 Rivière ( -1985 and André Varagnac (1894 Varagnac ( -1983 to organize the Congrès International de Folklore (CIFL) in Paris in 22 Stith Thompson, who attended the congress, commented on it in his memoirs as follows:
They had representatives from all over Europe. This was the first time I had had a chance to meet any of the folklorists from Hitler Germany. One of these who was to be of considerable importance in German folklore after the war was Gustav Henssen, director of the Folktale Archive in Berlin. He told me a good deal about it. [. . .] Most interesting to me was the group of new folklorists that had arisen in France since I was there ten years earlier. The leader of these was Georges-Henri Rivière. He was now the chief of the Department and Museum of Popular Traditions and they were just opening their headquarters at the Palais de Chaillot. (Thompson 1996, 148-49) Thompson makes no further mention of the "folklorists from Hitler Germany." In his letters and memoirs, the American professor consciously seems to avoid commenting on the political situation in Germany during the 1930s. When writing about his trips to Europe during this period, he normally describes his meetings with different scholars and different cultures; his silence regarding Germany is telling, since he was involved in several IAFE conflicts due to his role as an American representative. Mostly, however, Thompson concentrated on bringing IAFE and Folk to the attention of American scholars, finding European colleagues who could assist his work on the motif and type indexes. He also tried to help the association with applications for funding in America (Thompson 1936-50 and Herman Geijer, he probably knew about the tension with German researchers. But it is likely that discussions of these problems were confined to private meetings and therefore not mentioned in his memoirs.
For example, Thompson did not comment on the relatively large German delegation at the Paris congress. Germany sent no fewer than eighteen ethnologists, folklorists, and politicians to Paris. As Adolf Helbok stated in a report to REM after the meetings ended, the goal was to demonstrate the "superiority of German research in the field":
Thus, among all the guests, people of Germanic extraction [Germanen] (and among them, the Germans [Deutschen]) had almost exclusive control of the proceedings [i.e., "the course of conversation was in their hands"].
As to the quality of the performance, it can be said without exaggeration that the Germans, both in their lectures and in discussion, were absolutely pre-eminent. (Helbok 1937 ) 23 Helbok's whole report is characterized by a nationalistic and Nazi discourse on the superiority of German scholarship. For Helbok and other Nazi-influenced scholars, it was clear that Germany should lead all future research in the field of folklore and ethnology, and it was important to demonstrate German superiority in the moment as well. Helbok and his Nazi-influenced colleagues used the congress to strengthen their own national identity; they paid attention to other research only in order to confirm Germany's leading position.
At the Paris congress, Jan de Vries told Helbok about the difficulties in funding the IAFE's work and its journal, and he suggested that the organization needed a new vice president, since Adolf Spamer was not very active from Berlin. Helbok realized that the IAFE/IAEEF and Folk were in crisis and seized the opportunity to advance his own career. In his report to the REM, Helbok asked the minister for permission to be the IAEEF's new vice president, as de Vries had suggested in Paris, and for permission for a German representative to sit on the board of Folk. He also suggested new funding for Folk to secure "the German influence" in the field-but this never happened. Helbok's aim was to create a kind of "German censorship" for all Folk articles related to Germany in order to prevent negative interpretations of Nazi Germany from being published. He also argued that more editorial involvement in the journal could give Germany an excellent position of power in folklore and ethnology. Helbok regarded himself as the Führer in this field of knowledge and emphasized that he was accepted by everyone in Paris without any problems (Helbok 1937) . Recent research documents his ambition to lead all ethnologists and folklorists the world over (Johler 1994, 546) . But the question remains: why did the IAEEF board accept him as a vice president? And why did they allow Nazi-influenced scholars to join their organization at all?
Folklore and Ethnology between Democracy and Dictatorship
By 1938, Nazi-influenced scholars and politicians had strengthened their positions in Germany, partly through the influential rise of the new generation of academics. The behavior of the 1937 German delegation in Paris was a clear expression of the new Nazi politics, and particularly of the way Nazi leaders took for granted that folklore and ethnology would be dominated by Nazi ideology. Several researchers from other areas, including Scandinavia and France, had been critical of the Germans at the Paris congress. But Helbok, of course, did not mention the delegation's critics in his report to the REM. Helbok also never mentioned that several of his German colleagues in Paris were impressed and inspired by the French folklorists' work with "Musée de Terroir," a new kind of exhibition created by Rivière and his colleagues (Gorgus 1999, 190) .
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In a letter to Herman Geijer, Åke Campbell, who took part in the Paris congress, described the Germans as being a little confused:
The Germans did not really know what to do-but von Sydow, Duilearga, Thompson asked me to arrange a dinner as soon as possible for collecting everybody + the Germans + some of the Frenchmen. So that no dangerous constellations could occur in this concentration of interests without any purposeful guidance. (Campbell 1937b) 25 Here, Campbell constructs and describes different interests within different national discourses as possible threats to one another. Pushing the Germans and the French to the background, he privileges himself and his Swedish, Irish, and American colleagues ("everybody") as the active participants, those who must act fast in order to prevent new, "dangerous constellations." With the French scholars entering the scene, the Swedish researchers felt it was important to organize international cooperation in a way that aligned with their own perspectives; thus, they allied with the American and the Irish representatives, Thompson and Ó Duilearga. The lines I quote above show that it still was not obvious to Campbell that the Germans should be included in international cooperation within the IAEEF: he mentions them separately. He also mentions the French separately, perhaps because they had only recently Åke Campbell, Manne Eriksson, and Carin Kumlin-Hedblom outside Uppsala University's library (Carolina Rediviva), 1938. At the time, the office of the dialect and folklore archives (Dialekt-och folkminnesarkivet) in Uppsala was in the university's library. Manne Eriksson and Folke Hedblom were working at the archives; Carin Kumlin-Hedblom was Hedblom's wife. (Photographer: Folke Hedblom. Folke Hedblom collection, 1938, Uppland/Uppsala, ULMA 37/38, Institutet för språk och folkminnen, Uppsala, Sweden) entered the international scene and had not yet established their position. Campbell describes himself as the leader of the negotiations between these different groups. It was significant that he, Von Sydow, Ó Duilearga, and Thompson took on the task of organizing international cooperation so as to make it impossible for others, such as the Germans, to shape the situation. But what were the alliances that the four men so feared?
An answer to this question appears in a letter from Campbell to Von Sydow some months later:
Now, too, we represent the French initiative after the Paris congress, and I know that the French want a positive continuation of the work toward cooperation between the Germans and the French that was started during the Paris congress. If we cannot reach a suitable agreement with the Germans, there is a risk that the French would go on with their policy and create an association directly with the Germans. But, in fact, I have to say that this is not an immediate danger, because our relations with the French are currently close and friendly. (Campbell 1938) 26 Still, Campbell was afraid of a possible "folkloristic Rome-Berlin Axis":
Meanwhile, it could be something totally different with the relationship between Germany-Italy. Indeed, [Konrad] Hahm explained to me that as far as he could see, we do not have to worry about a folkloristic scholarly Berlin-Rome Axis. But of course, a folkloristic association between the representatives of the authoritarian countries is something that we must seriously take into account. (Campbell 1938) 27 The IAFE and IAEEF were built around geopolitical boundaries and national delegates, and this model of organization had become a serious problem. At the beginning of the 1930s, when the association was first planned, a body of national representatives was probably looked upon as something 'natural,' due to a common discourse that conflated national and cultural borders. The IAFE was built both on national representation and on the scholarly network of Von Sydow and his Scandinavian colleagues. 28 An advantage of this model was that Von Sydow and his associates could choose representatives according to their scientific skills and international reputations.
In his May 1938 letter to Von Sydow, Campbell also explained that, in an effort to prevent a "folkloristic Rome-Berlin Axis," he had written to Italian colleagues Rafaele Corso and Guiseppe Vidossi and that even "Sigurd Erixon had agreed . . . to bring these gentlemen into our journal." They also wanted to include Greece and the Balkan states in the IAEEF. After Germany's annexation of Austria in the spring of 1938, scholars in democratic countries feared that the authoritarian regimes would try to take over democratic organizations like the IAEEF or that these regimes would start new alliances among themselves. Though there were no official discussions of disbanding the IAEEF, Campbell ruminated that taking such action could have negative consequences and could even put their German colleagues in danger. He wrote to Von Sydow on May 19, 1938: We [Campbell and De Vries] believe that it would be a misfortune if our organization should be disbanded due to careless handling of negotiations between the different countries' representatives. How will it go for the talented German scholars if they are isolated because of incompetence from our side? We think we are seeing that Kaiser, for example, now hopes that the conflicts can be reduced and that research can achieve more freedom, since Germany had its big success with Austria.
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Here the IAEEF is an instrument that can bring forward acceptable (i.e., nonpolitical) German scholarship and counteract Nazi influence in the field of ethnology and folklore. In addition to guiding scholarship in authoritarian countries in the 'right' direction, Campbell introduced a moral dimension with the rhetorical question "How will it go for the talented German scholars?" In Campbell's mind, the IAEEF also had a responsibility to help its German colleagues who were threatened by the rising power of the new generation of Nazi scholars. This is one answer to the question of why Swedish and British scholars continued to cooperate with Nazi German scholars. The letter also expresses hope for a better situation: it is interesting to examine how Campbell describes Kaiser as slightly optimistic about his situation now, after "Germany had its big success with Austria." Campbell reproduces a common National Socialistic discourse from the late 1930s when he includes the official German description of the Anschluss of Austria without further comment, embracing the annexation as a possible resolution to tensions and a way to gain more academic freedom in Germany. This was probably the reason Campbell and De Vries interpreted 1938 as a time to take action.
Campbell's letter, in fact, is an answer to one received from Von Sydow. As early as 1935 Von Sydow was getting tired of the "decadent German scholarship," as he called it (e.g., Von Sydow 1935) . In a letter to Campbell in May 1938, he suggested an open protest of the REM. Von Sydow wanted stronger opposition to the REM's politics and argued that the IAEEF should appoint German representatives by itself instead of asking the Nazi regime for names. According to him, it was unacceptable that politicians at the REM should suggest representatives for the IAEEF, and it was time to make clear that international scholars viewed German scholarship as in decline (Campbell 1938) . 30 Campbell strongly rejected this idea, because it could endanger German colleagues in ways similar to threats faced by colleagues in Russia:
Of course, the situation in Germany is far from being the same as in Russia, but we must be careful nonetheless. I want to mention to you that I have been told about the danger that Russian scholars are put in, through even the most insignificant action from our side. For example, do you want to take responsibility for putting things right with the Soviet Russian ideology in our field when you know that this will immediately make our Russian contacts responsible. We wanted to publish in our journal Folk-Liv an article that I have commissioned from [Dmitrij] Zelenin, 31 but not until arrangements have been made through the Soviet Bureau for Foreign Affairs. Perhaps we have some doubts about this publication, but not because of respect for the Germans, but rather out of respect for Zelenin himself. But we hope that it will be fine, and that Zelenin can be proud of being presented to Western Europe by means of this article. But of course, this article is not directed against any other country's research; otherwise we would not print it. (Campbell 1938) a strong influence on relationships with the authoritarian states until the beginning of World War II.
Another problem during this period was the demand from the authoritarian states-e.g., Germany and Italy-that representatives in international organizations be appointed by each country's government rather than internally nominated by scholars themselves. In the IAEEF, de Vries had suggested that every country should appoint its own representatives. In 1938, de Vries and Campbell agreed on a diplomatic solution: the scholars in democratic states would appoint their representatives themselves, while in the authoritarian states the government would choose them. But Von Sydow seemed to dislike this idea and asserted in his letter to Campbell that the IAEEF should choose its own representatives, without any governmental involvement. Campbell was upset. He responded:
Do you mean that we should not accept this principle [different kinds of appointments in democratic and authoritarian states], and that we by ourselves independently appoint representatives in such [authoritarian] states? De Vries and I are convinced that under these conditions nobody wants to be a representative. (Campbell 1938; underlining in original) 33 Thus, the demand by authoritarian states was probably another reason the IAEEF accepted devout Nazis like Helbok and Harmjanz as German representatives in 1938. Here, the IAEEF's diplomatic efforts subordinated democratic principles to authoritarian politics, and it was accepted that scholarship would be directed by politicians in authoritarian states. Those responsible for brokering this compromise probably did not find other options plausible, given the threats they feared to their respected colleagues and their desire to maintain existing collaborations. Established relationships of scholarly cooperation in the IAEEF were probably perceived as too valuable to be risked. At the same time, the leaders of the IAEEF hoped to exert at least some influence on scholarship from the authoritarian countries, directing it in a more liberal, democratic path.
Helbok was finally accepted as the IAFE's vice president because, according to Campbell, he seemed to be a person who "could represent the German research without risking the representatives of the earlier research." Campbell added in his May 1938 letter to Von Sydow, "as you surely understand, it is important for our association to help, not destroy" (hjälpa och icke stjälpa). He pointed out that several German colleagues (here he mentioned Wildhagen and Kaiser) had told him and Geijer that they did not want any "international involvement," because this "could make things worse." Another reason for the acceptance of Helbok in IAEEF was probably his experience with the ADV in Berlin, where he was the project's leader from 1932 to 1933 (Schmoll 2009, 105) .
In 1939, Campbell was invited to Leipzig to give some lectures, and there he met Helbok and the German philologist and ethnologist Theodor Frings (1886 -1968 . In a February letter to Geijer, Campbell mentioned how much he disliked the "younger generation" of ethnologists in Germany. According to Campbell, they were pushy people who would not listen to their seniors and wasted time talking about "blood, earth, culture" (Blut, Boden, Kultur) . The latter was nothing to take seriously, according to Campbell (1939) . Campbell's letters provide an interesting example of how a Swedish ethnologist interpreted scholarship and politics in Nazi Germany. The generational question is an important one. In Campbell's writings, he describes the younger generation of ethnologists in Germany as problematic, since they produced superficial research strongly influenced by Nazi politics. Campbell was much more confident in senior researchers -Mackensen, Kaiser, Wildhagen, and John Meier (1864-1953) -whom neither Campbell nor his colleagues understood to be Nazis or Nazi sympathizers. Instead, they categorized these men as victims of the system, even after the war. Perhaps the Swedish researchers maintained this opinion because the Germans followed Nazi recommendations to keep their politics and, especially, anti-Semitic opinions to themselves when visiting Sweden. In addition, many Swedes envisioned themselves as politically neutral, in the sense that they should neither talk about politics nor comment on other countries' affairs (e.g., Almgren 2005 and Garberding 2007) . This discourse about neutrality made it possible to continue cooperation with Nazi Germany: Campbell and his colleagues steadfastly defined their connections as purely scientific and apolitical.
Conclusion
"Within the context of the National Socialist ideology, folklore emerged as a field of general importance," folklorist Christa Kamenetsky wrote in 1972 (221). Numerous publications since 1972 emphasize the impact that folklore and ethnology had on Nazi politics, documenting how the Holocaust was legitimized through studies in these disciplines and with the active support of scholars in these fields. However, these studies also cite examples of critique and resistance in the face of brutal Nazi politics (e.g., Dow and Lixfeld 1994; Gerndt 1987; Jacobeit, Lixfeld, and Bockhorn 1994; Kaschuba 2006; Schmoll 2009) .
In this article I have analyzed how some Swedish folklorists and ethnologists reacted to the rise of Nazi influence within international scholarly circles. The Swedes' opinions and actions were influenced by close connections to scholars from Great Britain and the United States, especially within the context of the International Association of Folklore and Ethnology/Internationaler Verband für Volksforschung (IAFE) and its successor organization, the International Association for European Ethnology and Folklore (IAEEF). These organizations are significant because of the ways they illuminate connections between scholarship and politics, and for what they reveal about how different stances regarding knowledge production are negotiated when democratic and authoritarian systems meet.
Swedish researchers were among the founders of the IAFE and the IAEEF. At the beginning of the 1930s, ethnology and folklore were more established as academic disciplines in Sweden than they were in several other European countries. This was probably one of the reasons the Swedish researchers felt responsible for the development of their discipline in Europe-and why they also had a great interest in directing their discipline internationally according to their own preferences.
The influence of Swedish folklorists and ethnologists played out within a context in which authoritarian and democratic systems clashed, and in the late 1930s the IAEEF tried to adapt to both systems. While some of the British scholars wanted to exclude Germany from the new organization, the Swedish scholars preferred a kind of diplomacy in which the Germans were accepted but kept in a clear minority. Thus, Swedish, British, and American scholars worked to establish a strong British and American presence in order to counteract Nazi influence. The close and well-established connections to British folklore and ethnology led to accusations from the Germans and the Dutch that they had been excluded from IAFE endeavors such as the Edinburgh congress.
Still, as the main negotiator, Åke Campbell expressed hope that international cooperation could encourage scholarship uninfluenced by political ideology, and he feared for the future of German colleagues if the IAEEF refused to cooperate with the ruling regimes. Thus, the Swedes were reluctant to exclude German colleagues they had worked with prior to 1933 and had experienced as 'good' and 'serious' researchers-in other words, men who put scholarship above politics. In reality, several of these trusted colleagues openly sympathized with Nazi ideology (or at least with parts of it) and collaborated with the Nazi regime. The majority of the German researchers discussed in this article-including Mackensen, Helbok, and Harmjanz-were condemned after the war and lost their positions (Dow and Lixfeld 1994; Henne 2010; Jacobeit, Lixfeld, and Bockhorn 1994; Schmoll 2008 Schmoll , 2009 . Thus, by choosing Helbok and Harmjanz as new representatives in 1937 and 1938, IAEEF members effectively legitimized Nazi politics. Because of the outbreak of the war, however, these two delegates did not have much opportunity to spread their propaganda on an international scale.
Complicating matters was the fact that during the mid-1930s, German authorities competed among themselves for control of folklore and ethnology, as well as the Atlas der deutschen Volkskunde (ADV). A new generation of scholars had entered the scene in Germany, and the majority were more radical Nazis who worked to wed folklore and ethnology to Nazi politics. However, several of the German representatives in the IAFE sympathized with Alfred Rosenberg's Reichsgemeinschaft (REM), which lost power in the second half of the 1930s. As a consequence, some of these representatives got into trouble with their government, which is probably one reason their Swedish colleagues regarded them as victims of the Nazi regime rather than as Nazi collaborators.
It is also possible that the Swedish interpretation of these German colleagues as non-Nazis is an expression of a hegemonic discourse about Swedish neutrality at that time. On the one hand, Germans did not expect Swedes to take up a clear political position: it was good enough when they 'sympathized with' (i.e., did not criticize) Germany and wanted to maintain relations. On the other hand, Swedes took it for granted that they were looked on as politically neutral, and for that reason, they experienced their scholarly work, even in cooperation with Nazi German colleagues, as something non-political and purely scientific.
Here another discourse is important: for scholars from democratic systems, it seemed obvious and almost natural that serious, scientific, objective work should be free from any political influence. Then the Swedish scholars 'discovered' that several of the member countries in the IAFE had turned into brutal dictatorships, with the consequence of state control of all scholarship. When they recognized this fact in 1938, the Nazi system and the communist system in the Soviet Union were already well established, with politicians who were strong believers in the prevailing ideologies and unlikely to be swayed by academic interventions.
Even in 1938, however, the scholars in the IAEEF hoped to cooperate with Nazi Germany. In addition to wanting to protect German colleagues from persecution and redirect or liberate scholarship in these authoritarian states, some scholars feared that alliances between France and Germany or Italy and Germany could be established that would push the disciplines of ethnology and folklore in the 'wrong' direction. Ethnology and folklore were still young disciplines in the mid-1930s, and a struggle to define the fields was underway. Yet another reason for cooperation with Nazi Germany was probably the persistent discourse of national and regional distinctiveness, wherein the leaders of the IAEEF argued for the necessity of including representatives from Central Europe. For several scholars in the organization, it seemed to be unthinkable to have Central European representation without Germany. They also had great respect for German atlas work and had already established close connections to the ADV in Berlin.
The archived materials that I have studied show that Nazi race politics were criticized by some of the leading folklorists and ethnologists in the IAFE and the IAEEF. However, these scholars primarily questioned Nazi attempts to control scientific work and use it as an instrument for Nazi propaganda. My research has not yet revealed more general critical statements from these scholars about Nazi German anti-Semitic politics or the persecution of Jews. In Sweden, for example, some ethnologists and folklorists sympathized with Nazi ideology or at least with parts of it (Garberding 2011) . But anti-Semitic and racist discourses also occur in texts from scholars critical of Nazism generally, for example, in lectures in which West European Jews are described as a "better kind" than East European Jews, because they were better assimilated to Western culture (Garberding 2010 and . Swedish research on Sweden's relations to Nazi Germany has demonstrated that anti-Semitic ideas were quite common in Swedish society at that time. Historians Mikael Byström and Karin Kvist Geverts refer to "anti-Semitic background noise" (det antisemitiska bakgrundbruset): they note that talking about Jews in anti-Semitic terms was a widely accepted practice (2007, . But the research also demonstrates that undemocratic and violent politics toward Jews, as practiced by the Nazi regime, would not have been accepted in Sweden, where democracy and individual freedom were deeply rooted (e.g., Åmark 2011; Byström 2006; Garberding 2007; Kvist Geverts 2008; Oredsson 1996; Rosengren 2007) .
Studying cooperation among folklore and ethnology scholars in Europe, the British Isles, and the United States during the 1930s-relationships that were forged and negotiated under the shadow of Nazism and other rising dictatorships-gives insight into the difficulties faced when different ideological systems meet on the field of knowledge production. Scholars who attempted to find common ground between democratic and authoritarian systems faced a number of quandaries, and careful analysis of discourse circulated among and between different parties reveals argumentation strategies that construct people, stances, and fields in sometimes contradictory or selfserving ways. It must be noted, however, that there has never again been such a close international network of folklorists and ethnologists as that which existed during the 1930s.
Södertörn University
Huddinge, Sweden Notes 1. Discussing these fields is itself complicated, especially in an international context. What may be called social-or cultural anthropology in the United States is European ethnology (earlier, Volkskunde) in today's Germany; in Sweden, the term is ethnology. While the term folklore is not normally used in contemporary Germany (because folklore is included in the broader discipline of European ethnology), it is commonly used in English-speaking countries to refer to studies of oral culture. In Sweden, the term folkloristik (folklore) is still used today for describing studies of oral culture, but many Swedish ethnologists, too, include folklore within the subject of ethnology. During the 1930s, the period under consideration for this article, the discipline was called ethnology in several countries when it referred to studies of material culture, while folklore described studies of 'mental' culture, including narratives, storytelling, ideas, and beliefs (Rogan 2008b) . In 1930s Germany, the discipline was called Volkskunde, a term that included both material and non-material culture. In this article, I refer to the discipline as ethnology because this is the name used today in Sweden. This term encompasses both non-material culture (folklore) and material culture (ethnology). But when it is important for my analysis, or, for example, when a scholar wants to emphasize his or her position as a folklorist (rather than as a non-ethnologist), I describe these scholars as folklorists. 23. German original: "So hatten unter den Gästen die Germanen und unter diesen die Deutschen die fast ausschliessliche Wortführung in den Händen. Was die Qualität der Leistung anlangt, so kann ohne jede Uebertreibung gesagt werden, dass die Deutschen sowohl in ihren Vorträgen, wie in der Diskussion absolut den Vorrang besassen." 24. Georges Henri Rivière and his colleagues preferred to call their discipline folklore; they included studies of both non-material and material culture within its purview (Gorgus 1999, 118) .
25. Swedish original: "Tyskarna visste visst inte riktigt hur de skulle ha sig-men von Sydow, Duilearga, Thompson bad mig snarast att ordna med en middag som skulle samla alla + tyskarna + några av fransmännen. Så att ej farliga konstellationer skulle hinna utbildas i denna samling av intressen utan målmedveten ledning." 26. Swedish original: "Vi representera ju numera även det franska iniativet efter Paris-kongressen, och jag vet att fransmännen önska en positiv fortsättning på den ansats till samarbete mellan tyskar och fransmän, som framträdde under Pariskongressen. Kunna vi icke komma till en rimlig uppgörelse med tyskarna, så är det fara värt, att fransmännen gå fram på sin linje och skapa en association direkt med tyskarna. Dock måste jag säga, att denna fara väl icke äro överhängande, då våra förbindelser med fransmännen numera äro intima och hjärtliga." 27. Swedish original: "Helt annat kan det emellertid vara med förhållandet Tyskland-Italien. [Konrad] Hahm framhöll visserligen för mig, att vi icke behövde befara, såvitt han kunde se, en folkloristisk vetenskaplig axel Berlin-Rom. Men det är ju klart, att ett folkloristiskt förbund mellan de auktoritära staternas representanter är något, som man allvarligt måste ta med i räkningen."
28. These assumptions would change after the war; for example, the IAEEF's successor organization, La Commission Internationale des Arts et Traditions Populaires (CIAP), questioned the idea of national representation (Rogan 2008b) .
29. Swedish original: "Vi anse, att det skulle vara en olycka, om vårt förbund upplöstes på grund av oskickligt handhavande av förhandlingarna mellan de olika ländernas forskningsrepresentanter. Hur skall det gå för de duktiga tyska forskarna, om de bliva isolerade på grund av oskicklighet från vår sida? Vi tro oss märka t.ex. på Kaiser, att han numera hoppas, att motsättningarna skola mildras och forskningen erhålla en större frihet, sedan Tyskland haft den stora framgången med Österrike."
30. Unfortunately, I have been unable to locate the original letter from von Sydow to Campbell, to which Campbell is responding. Campbell mentions in his May 19, 1938 letter to von Sydow, however, that he had earlier received one from von Sydow. Moreover, the language of Campbell's letter shows that he is responding very clearly to suggestions from von Sydow's earlier letter.
31. Dmitrij Zelenin (1878-1954) was a Russian linguist and ethnographer who worked at the Institute of Anthropology and Ethnography in Moscow.
32. Swedish original: "Naturligtvis är förhållandena i Tyskland på långt när icke sådana som i Ryssland, men vi måste ändock iaktaga försiktighet. Jag vill nämna för Dig, att jag blivit underrättad om den fara, som ryska forskare utsättas för även genom den obetydligaste aktion från vår sida. Vill Du t.ex. ta på Ditt ansvar, att gå till rätta med den sovjetryska ideologin på vårt forskningsområde, då Du vet, att man genast kommer att ställa våra ryska förbindelser till ansvar. Vi skola i vår tidskrift FOLK-LIV trycka en uppsats, som jag anskaffat av Zelenin, dock först genom förmedling av Sovjets utrikesbyrå. Vi tveka kanske något inför denna publicering, icke av hänsyn till tyskarna utan av hänsyn till Zelenin själv. Vi hoppas emellertid, att det ska gå bra, och att Zelenin skall komma att glädja sig över att ha fått framträda inför Västeuropa med denna uppsats. Naturligtvis är artikeln ej riktat mot annat lands forskning, så vi naturligtvis ej kunnat trycka den." 33. Swedish original: "Anser Du, att vi icke skola antaga denna princip utan alltså på egen hand oberoende av regeringen tillsätta representanter i sådana stater? De Vries och jag äro fast övertygade om, att ingen vill på sådana villkor bli representant."
